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THE USES AND ABUSES OF SIMPLEXITY
Lawrence Zelenak ∗
INTRODUCTION
Although the importance of IRS publications in the administration of the
federal income tax can hardly be overstated, before Joshua D. Blank’s and Leigh
Osofsky’s comprehensive study of simplexity in IRS publications 1 scholars had
given those publications almost no attention. 2 In their article, Blank and Osofksy
make two important contributions to the scholarly literature on tax
administration. The first (and more specific) contribution is the analysis of
simplexity in IRS publications—their diagnosis of the problem of simplexity
and their explanation of how it can be managed (not cured). The second (and
more general) contribution is their opening up of the unexplored field of IRS
publications to scholarly examination.
I agree with all their major conclusions—including, most significantly, that
some simplexity is inevitable in carrying out the IRS’s duty of explaining
immensely complex tax laws to a general readership. I also agree that the
primary response to that inevitability should be extensive “red-flagging” of
publications to alert readers to particular instances of simplexity and to refer
them to the regulations, rulings, and judicial opinions which the publications
have simplexified. Given their focus on the virtues of plain writing, I should add
that Blank’s and Osofsky’s article is a model of clarity and grace of expression,
and a pleasure to read.
The remainder of this brief essay is devoted to a few points on which I
disagree with the analysis of Blank and Osofksy (none of which affect my
agreement with their major conclusions), and to a few thoughts—inspired by
reading Blank and Osofksy—on a few non-simplexity aspects of IRS
publications.

∗
1

Pamela B. Gann Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the Tax Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 189

(2016).
2 A significant recent exception is Emily Cauble’s analysis of the limited circumstances under which
taxpayers should be entitled to rely on statements in IRS publications (and on other types of IRS guidance).
Emily Cauble, Detrimental Reliance on IRS Guidance, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 421.
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I. THE IRS WAS INTO SIMPLEXITY WHEN SIMPLEXITY WASN’T COOL
Although Blank and Osofsky do not explicitly assert a causal connection
between the Plain Writing Act of 2010 and the prevalence of simplexity in IRS
publications, a reader of their article might easily come away with the
impression that the 2010 Act has been a major cause of simplexity in IRS
publications. 3 However, as Blank and Osofksy themselves explain, long before
2010 the IRS acknowledged its responsibility to make the tax laws
comprehensible to taxpayers and assigned publications a key role in its discharge
of that duty. 4 According to the IRS’s current mission statement, adopted in 1998
(more than a decade before the Plain Writing Act), the agency’s mission is to
“provide America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping them understand
and meet their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law with integrity and
fairness to all.” 5 Similarly, even before the 2010 Act, the IRS’s most important
publication—Publication 17, “Your Federal Income Tax for Individuals”—
described itself as “explain[ing] the tax law to make sure you pay only the tax
you owe and no more.” 6
Thus, long before plain writing legislation was even a gleam in the
congressional eye, the IRS was writing publications aimed at explaining the
intricacies of the federal income tax in plain language to the average taxpayer.
Of course, the IRS might have responded to the Plain Writing Act by redoubling
its efforts to make its publications comprehensible. But did it? Consider the
several examples of simplexity discussed in detail by Blank and Osofsky. 7 For
each example, Blank and Osofsky cite to the most recent publication; they do
not investigate whether the described simplexification arose before or after
2010. As it turns out, all but one of the nine examples predate the Plain Writing
Act (in language identical to the current language). 8
3

Blank & Osofsky, supra note 1, at 189, 198–99 (focusing on the Plain Writing Act in the second sentence
of the abstract and describing the Act as “reinforc[ing] and expand[ing] the IRS’s duty to explain the tax law to
taxpayers”).
4 Id. at 197.
5 I.R.S. News Release IR-98-59, New IRS Mission Statement Emphasizes Taxpayer Service (Sept. 24,
1998), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-98-59.pdf (emphasis added); Blank & Osofksy, supra note 1, at 197–
98.
6 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 17, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX 5
(2009).
7 As noted later, I question whether some of the examples actually involve simplexity. See infra text
accompanying notes 20–29.
8 Compare Blank & Osfofsky, supra note 1, at 207 (concerning the deductibility of ordinary and necessary
business expenses), with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 535, BUSINESS EXPENSES 2 (2010). Compare
Blank & Osofsky, supra note 1, at 210–12 (concerning the deductibility of home mortgage refinancing points),
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The sole exception—the only example discussed by Blank and Osofsky
which did not appear verbatim in a publication predating the Plain Writing Act—
is the language concerning the exclusion of gain from the sale of a principal
residence. 9 Whereas the earlier publication language followed the regulations in
referring to the taxpayer’s financial ability to maintain a home becoming
“materially” impaired and the suitability of the taxpayer’s property as a home
“materially” changing, 10 the current Publication 523 refers instead to
“significant financial difficulty” and a “significantly less suitable main home.” 11
It is possible that this one change was inspired by the Plain Writing Act; the IRS
may have believed—and may have been right in believing—that some taxpayers
would not have been familiar with the use of “material” in the sense of
“significant.” Even if that is so, however, consideration of the history of the
simplexity examples offered by Blank and Osofksy strongly suggests that
simplexity in IRS publications developed long before the Plain Writing Act of
2010, and that the Act has had at most a minor effect in encouraging further
simplexification. This is not surprising, considering that—as Blank and Osofsky
demonstrate—the IRS was committed long before 2010 to making the tax laws
comprehensible to the average taxpayer.
II. DO THE PEOPLE WHO WRITE THE DIFFERENT IRS PUBLICATIONS EVER
TALK TO ONE ANOTHER?
As Blank and Osofksy note, Publication 17, “Your Federal Income Tax for
Individuals,” is unique among IRS publications in featuring (on the bottom of
its “Contents” page) a disclaimer. 12 The disclaimer makes two important points:

with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 936, HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 5 (2009). Compare
Blank & Osofsky, supra note 1, at 212–14 (concerning tax characterization of leveraged leases), with INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 535, at 9. Compare Blank & Osofsky, supra note 1, at 214–17 (concerning
capitalization of improvements), with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 535, at 3. Compare Blank &
Osofsky, supra note 1, at 219–21 (concerning IRA rollovers), with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 590,
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS (IRAS) 24 (2010). Compare Blank & Osofsky, supra note 1, at 221–
24 (concerning bartering deductions), with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 535, at 4. Compare Blank &
Osofsky, supra note 1, at 224–26 (concerning early individual retirement account distributions), with INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 590, at 52–53. Compare Blank & Osofsky, supra note 1, at 226–28 (concerning
characterization of an activity as profit-seeking), with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 535, at 5. Only when
Blank & Osofsky discuss IRA rollovers do they note the publication history of the language. See Blank &
Osofsky, supra note 1, at 219–21.
9 Blank & Osofsky, supra note 1, at 217–19.
10 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 523, SELLING YOUR HOME 15 (2010).
11 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 523, SELLING YOUR HOME 5 (2015).
12 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 17, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX (2015);
Blank & Osofksy, supra note 1, at 239–40.
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that “the information given does not cover every situation and is not intended to
replace the law or change its meaning,” and that “this publication will continue
to present the interpretations by the IRS” despite the existence of a judicial
interpretation (other than a Supreme Court opinion) more taxpayer-favorable
than the IRS’s view. 13 Blank and Osofsky consider disclaimers of this sort to be
so inadequate as to be nearly worthless, 14 so they are not much troubled by the
uniqueness of the Publication 17 disclaimer.
Although I agree with Blank and Osofsky that stand-alone disclaimers give
taxpayers insufficient warning of lurking simplexity, in my view a well-written
and prominent disclaimer (the Publication 17 disclaimer is well-written but
could be considerably more prominent) could serve a valuable warning function
if combined with the sort of red-flagging (or annotation) approach recommended
by Blank and Osofsky. 15 What seems to me indefensible—and inexplicable,
other than by some lost page of IRS history—is the IRS’s practice of including
a disclaimer in one publication but not in any other. The uniqueness of the
Publication 17 disclaimer suggests a failure of communication and of quality
control among the writers and editors responsible for the various publications.
If a disclaimer is a good idea in the context of one publication—and I believe it
is—it is inconceivable that it would not be a good idea for every other
publication as well.
This is not the only puzzling inconsistency in the IRS’s current tactics for
dealing with simplexity issues in its various publications. In discussing their
recommendation that IRS publications red flag (or at least annotate) instances of
simplexity, Blank and Osofsky give no indication that the IRS currently makes
any use of red flagging or annotations. 16 That is true, or nearly true, for many
publications. Publication 17, for example, by my count has only nine annotations
(all references to documents in the Internal Revenue Bulletin) in its 244
substantive pages. 17 Similarly, Publication 523, “Selling Your Home,” has only
one annotation in its eighteen substantive pages. 18

13

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 12.
Blank & Osofksy, supra note 1, at 252.
15 See id. at 252–56 (proposing red-flagging or annotations).
16 As Blank and Osofsky use the term, “red flagging” involves explicitly noting IRS simplifications,
explaining that they represent safe-harbor positions, and identifying other reasonable interpretations of the law.
Id. at 252. By contrast, “annotation” only requires “hav[ing] the IRS simply annotate its Publications with links
to all the sources of law that the IRS is relying upon.” Id. at 256.
17 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 12.
18 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 11.
14
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As with disclaimers, however, there is a striking exception to the norm.
Publication 535, “Business Expenses,” features about forty annotations in its
forty-five substantive pages. 19 Most of these are just annotations, rather than the
more informative red-flagging proposed by Blank and Osofsky. The annotations
reference Internal Revenue Code provisions, Treasury regulations, and various
types of Internal Revenue Bulletin (IRB) pronouncements (with hyperlinks in
the case of IRB materials), but not judicial opinions. Although Blank and
Osofsky would not view Publication 535 as fully implementing their
recommendations—both because the annotations are not as informative as they
would prefer and because of the failure to alert taxpayers to judicial
interpretations differing from those of the IRS—the Publication 535 annotations
are a major step in the direction of the Blank and Osofsky proposal.
Again, the puzzle is the inconsistency. Why would the IRS heavily annotate
one publication (at the rate of almost one annotation per page), while providing
minimal annotations in other publications (at the rate of one annotation for every
twenty-seven pages, in the case of Publication 17)? Although the optimal density
of annotations might differ from publication to publication—based on various
considerations, including the complexity of the material covered and the level
of tax sophistication of the typical readers of different publications—the likely
explanation for annotation density differences of this magnitude is simple
inconsistency. Apparently, there is no IRS-wide policy as to how heavily
publications should be annotated, causing the writers and editors responsible for
different publications to make very different choices.
If there were an IRS Publication featuring both a disclaimer in the style of
Publication 17 and annotation density in the style of Publication 535, that
publication would at least come close to adequately warning taxpayers of its
simplexifications. The problem, of course, is that as of now there is no such
publication.
III. WHAT IS, AND ISN’T, SIMPLEXITY
Blank and Osofksy identify a number of classic examples of simplexity in
IRS publications, including the failure to mention judicial authority contrary to
the IRS view of the deductibility of home mortgage refinancing points, 20 and the
failure to fully describe the approved methods for avoiding the penalty tax on

19
20

See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 535, BUSINESS EXPENSES (2016).
Blank & Osofsky, supra note 1, at 210–12.
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early individual retirement account distributions. 21 In two cases, however, I
disagree with their characterizations of publication passages as examples of
simplexity. In a third case, I agree with their characterization of a publication
passage as an example of simplexity but think the problem uncovered by their
example is even worse than they suggest.
Case One. For many years, the IRS had taken the position in Publication 590,
“Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs),” that a statutory rule limiting
taxpayers to one tax-free IRA rollover per year applied on a per-account basis,
rather than a per-taxpayer basis, with the result that a taxpayer could make taxfree rollovers from two different IRAs in the same year. 22 The position taken by
the IRS in Publication 590 was based on a proposed regulation issued in 1981,
but never finalized. 23 In the widely-publicized Bobrow v. Commissioner case, 24
the Tax Court adopted (sua sponte, rather than at the urging of the IRS) a
different interpretation of the IRA rollover provision of the Code, 25 holding that
the one-rollover-per-year rule applied on a per-taxpayer basis.
Accepting, arguendo, the correctness of the Tax Court’s interpretation of the
Code, the position taken in Publication 590 was erroneous. But was it also a case
of simplexity? According to Blank and Osofsky, it was. 26 I disagree. The
Publication’s position was based on a proposed regulation, and the proposed
regulation was an interpretation of the statute (albeit an incorrect interpretation,
according to the Tax Court), not a simplification of it. 27 A per-account version
of the one-rollover-per-year rule is not simpler than a per-taxpayer version of
the rule; it is just different. Not every inaccuracy in an IRS Publication is
attributable to simplexity.
Case Two. In one instance, what Blank and Osofsky describe as an
inaccuracy in an IRS Publication is not, in my view, erroneous at all. They take
the IRS to task for its discussion in Publication 535 of the circumstances under
which a leveraged lease will be treated as a true lease for tax purposes. 28 In
particular, they criticize the publication for describing the requirements for

21

Id. at 224–26.
See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 590, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT
ARRANGEMENTS (IRAS) 25 (2009).
23 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-4(b)(4)(ii), 46 Fed. Reg. 36,198, 36,206 (July 14, 1981).
24 No. 7022-11, T.C.M. 2014-21, at 14 (2014).
25 I.R.C. § 408(d)(3) (2012).
26 Blank & Osofsky, supra note 1, at 219–21.
27 See supra note 21.
28 Blank & Osofsky, supra note 1, at 212–14.
22

ZELENAK GALLEYSFINAL

2017]

2/8/2017 9:09 AM

THE USES AND ABUSES OF SIMPLEXITY

2017

obtaining an advance ruling that a lease will be respected for tax purposes
without also mentioning that some courts have reached taxpayer-favorable
results on facts which would not have qualified for advance rulings. “While
some savvy taxpayers may go on to research judicial alternatives,” they write,
“many others may simply accept the IRS’s view.” 29
I see nothing wrong with the treatment of this topic in Publication 535. The
publication advises, “[i]f you plan to take part in what appears to be a leveraged
lease, you may want to get an advance ruling.” 30 It lists the requirements for
obtaining an advance ruling and states that those requirements apply “for
advance ruling purposes only.” 31 The Publication could not be any clearer on
the crucial point that it is describing the IRS’s advance ruling practices rather
than the substantive law. Moreover, the topic is leveraged leases, and almost by
definition any taxpayer involved in or contemplating a leveraged lease
transaction is a sophisticated taxpayer or has ready access to sophisticated tax
advice. The concern of Blank and Osofsky, that non-savvy taxpayers will be
misled, seems misplaced; in the world of leveraged leases there are only savvy
taxpayers.
Case Three. Blank and Osofsky rightly criticize the discussion in
Publication 535 of the distinction between improvements (the cost of which
must be capitalized) and repairs (the cost of which may be currently deducted). 32
They note the striking fact that “nearly all of the specific examples of
business expenses that IRS Publication 535 describes as improvements that must
be capitalized are also presented in specific examples in the applicable
regulations as repairs that may be deducted immediately.” 33 They also note that,
although the Publication 535 discussion leans heavily on the concept of “major
expenditures,” that terminology never appears in the very detailed regulations
distinguishing improvements from repairs. 34 Finally, they mention that the
governing regulations are quite recent, having been promulgated in 2013. 35 The
regulations are highly detailed; as published in the IRB, they occupy about fortyfive pages. Although the Treasury did not consider the regulations a radical

29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 214.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 19, at 9.
Id.
Blank & Osofksy, supra note 1, at 214–17.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 215–16, 215 n.164.
Id. at 215 (citing T.D. 9636, 2013-43 IRB 331).
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departure from previous law, 36 the regulations were decidedly more than a mere
restatement of the existing tax law of improvements and repairs.
What Blank and Osofsky do not mention is the remarkable fact that the
Publication 535 language on which they focus did not change at all in response
to the issuance of the new regulations. The last version of Publication 535
published before the promulgation of the new regulations stated that
improvements are “generally major expenditures,” and that “[s]ome examples
are: new electric wiring, a new roof, a new floor, new plumbing, bricking up
windows to strengthen a wall, and lighting improvements.” 37 Despite the
intervening issuance of the new regulations, identical language appears in the
current version of Publication 535. 38 Given that the IRS did not revise
Publication 535 in response to the new regulations, it is not terribly surprising
that—as Blank and Osofksy point out—the new regulations contradict “nearly
all” of the examples of improvements offered by Publication 535. If the IRS
Forms and Publications personnel are aware of the new regulations, there is no
evidence in current Publication 535 of that awareness. The apparent failure of
communication between the drafters of the regulations and the writers of
Publication 535 is disconcerting.
To be fair to the IRS, both before and after the promulgation of the new
regulations it would have been impossible to accurately describe the rules for
distinguishing repairs from improvements in the space available in a publication
covering the entire universe of business expense topics. But that impossibility
drives home the crucial conclusion of Blank and Osofsky—because simplexity
in IRS publications is inevitable in the case of many topics, the IRS should
supplement its simplexifications with red flagging. In this instance, in addition
to revising the examples of improvements, the writers of Publication 535 should
have included (at a minimum) a warning that the discussion of the topic in
Publication 535 was incomplete and a citation to the new regulations.

36 “The final regulations retain many of the provisions of the 2011 temporary and proposed regulations . . .
which in many instances incorporated standards from case law and other existing authorities under sections 162
and 263(a).” T.D. 9636, 2013-43 IRB 331, 332.
37 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 535, BUSINESS EXPENSES 3 (2013). The
same list of six examples of improvements goes back at least to 1994. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, PUB. NO. 535, BUSINESS EXPENSES 3 (1995) (for use in preparing 1994 returns). The description of
improvements as “generally major expenditures” first appeared a decade later. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 535, BUSINESS EXPENSES 3 (2005) (for use in preparing 2004 returns). Thus, not
only did the Publication not change in response to the 2013 final regulations, it also did not change in response
to the temporary and proposed regulations issued in 2011. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 263(a) (2011).
38 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 19, at 3.
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IV. AS LONG AS WE’RE TALKING ABOUT IRS PUBLICATIONS . . .
Although the following few paragraphs are not directly responsive to
anything in the Blank and Osofsky article, I cannot resist the opportunity to
mention two striking instances of the IRS taking a position in a publication
without taking the same position anywhere else. If the work of Blank and
Osofsky inspires—as I hope it will—an increased scholarly interest in the uses
and abuses of IRS publications, these two instances may serve as grist for the
scholarly mill.
Case One. The Internal Revenue Code provision governing the home
mortgage interest deduction is ambiguous about whether a taxpayer borrowing
$1.1 million to finance the purchase of a residence can deduct the interest on the
entire $1.1 million debt, or only the interest on $1 million of the debt. 39 The
statute permits a taxpayer to deduct interest on $1 million of “acquisition
indebtedness” and interest on $100,000 of “home equity indebtedness,” but it
provides no clear answer to the question of whether the last $100,000 of a
$1.1 million purchase money mortgage can qualify as home equity
indebtedness. In Pau v. Commissioner, 40 decided in 1997, the Tax Court agreed
with the IRS’s litigating position that a taxpayer in this situation could deduct
the interest on only $1 million of principal.
As it happened, in Publication 936, “Home Mortgage Interest Deduction,”
the IRS had made a taxpayer-favorable change in its position on this issue well
before the Tax Court’s 1997 decision in Pau. Consistent with the IRS’s litigating
position in Pau, the 1994 version of Publication 936 stated, “[i]f you take out a
loan for reasons other than to buy, build, or substantially improve your home, it
may qualify as home equity debt.” 41 The 1995 version of Publication 936,
however, did an about-face on this issue, adding the following after the sentence
quoted above: “In addition, debt you incurred to buy . . . your home, to the extent
it is more than the home acquisition debt limit, may qualify as home equity
debt.” 42 Substantially the same language has appeared in all subsequent versions
of Publication 936.

39

See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), (C)(ii) (2012).
No. 20475-94, 73 T.C.M. 1819, 1819 (1997).
41 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 936, HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST
DEDUCTION 9 (1995) (for use in preparing 1994 returns) (emphasis added).
42 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 936, HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST
DEDUCTION 8 (1996) (for use in preparing 1995 returns).
40
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Thus, at the time of the Pau litigation, the IRS’s litigating position was
directly contrary to the IRS’s position in Publication 936. To state the obvious,
the IRS should either have revised Publication 936 to bring it in line with the
IRS’s victory in Pau or announced that it had reconsidered the issue and was
abandoning its Tax Court triumph. For well over a decade, however, the IRS
took neither step. During that period, taxpayers conscientious enough to consult
Publication 936, but not tax-sophisticated (or compulsive) enough to research
judicial opinions and other actual sources of tax law, would have blithely
claimed interest deductions on $1.1 million of home mortgage principal. At the
same time, better-informed taxpayers would have struggled with whether to
accept or challenge the Pau interpretation. Finally, in 2010, the IRS resolved the
discrepancy—not, as one might have expected, by revising Publication 936—
but by issuing a revenue ruling rejecting Pau. 43
What should one make of this strange saga? It has nothing to do with
simplexity; neither interpretation of the statute is simpler than the other. But the
story does, of course, involve a discrepancy between the IRS’s actual position
on the issue and the position set forth in a publication. It is remarkable that such
a discrepancy—on a fairly high-profile issue involving a non-trivial number of
taxpayers—could have persisted for well over a decade. If one were making a
list of indications that the quality control for IRS publications is not all it might
be, the saga of the interest deduction on a $1.1 million home mortgage would
belong on the list.
Case Two. The second story shows the IRS in a better light. 44 In 1997,
Congress enacted I.R.C. §121, introducing a new set of rules for the exclusion
of gain on the sale of a principal residence. 45 Although the rules generally
permitted exclusion only if the taxpayer had owned and lived in the residence
for at least two years, an exception allowed an exclusion if the failure to satisfy
the two-year requirement was due to a change in place of employment, health,
or other unforeseen circumstances to be specified by regulation. 46 In that case,
however, the exclusion rules were less generous than for taxpayers satisfying the
two-year requirement. According to the statute as enacted in 1997, if, for
example, a taxpayer sold her home after only six months because of a change in
place of employment, and realized a gain of $40,000 on the sale, she could
43

Rev. Rul. 2010-25, 2010-44 I.R.B. 571–72.
The following discussion is based in part on RICHARD SCHMALBECK, LAWRENCE ZELENAK & SARAH B.
LAWSKY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 342–44 (4th ed. 2015).
45 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, § 312, 111 Stat. 788, 836 (1997).
46 The current version of the less-than-two-years exception is codified at I.R.C. §121(c)(2)(B) (2012).
44
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exclude only that fraction of her gain equal to the fraction of two years that she
had owned and lived in the home. 47 Thus, $10,000 of her gain would be excluded
and the other $30,000 would be taxable.
Oddly enough—but such is life in the sausage factory of tax legislation—the
Ways and Means Committee Report on the 1997 legislation described a very
different treatment of a taxpayer qualifying for an exception to the two-year
requirement. According to the Report, the usual ceiling on the amount of
excludable gain ($250,000, in the case of a single taxpayer) was to be multiplied
by the fraction of two years that the taxpayer had owned and lived in the home. 48
For our hypothetical taxpayer, this rule would mean a $62,500 ceiling on
excludable gain, resulting in the exclusion of all of her $40,000 gain—obviously
a much more favorable result than under the statutory formula.
Legislators noticed the discrepancy between the statute and the Ways and
Means description shortly after the August 5, 1997, date of enactment. By
October 1997 the Ways and Means Committee had approved a package of
technical corrections—described by its Chair, Bill Archer, as
“noncontroversial” 49—including revising the statutory less-than-two-year
exclusion formula to conform with the House Report, to be effective
retroactively as if included in the original legislation. 50 Although it was clear
that Congress would, sooner or later, retroactively change the statutory formula,
it was far from clear when Congress would bestir itself to do so. In the end, it
took the better part of a year; the revision was included in the IRS Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998, enacted in July 1998. 51
During the months in which the eventual enactment of a retroactive revision
of the exclusion formula was a virtual certainty, the IRS had the tricky task of
deciding how to administer the new exclusion regime. If it proceeded by way of
an official pronouncement in the IRB, it had only unattractive options. It could
hardly announce in a revenue ruling that, because it had a crystal ball, it was
interpreting the statute as if Congress had already enacted the anticipated
retroactive revision. On the other hand, it also made no sense for the IRS to
47 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, § 312, 111 Stat. at 836–37 (formerly codified at I.R.C.
§121(c)(1)).
48 H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 348 (1997).
49 Heidi Glenn, W & M Approves Corrections Bill, Expanded Education IRAs, 77 TAX NOTES 135 (1997).
50 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-56-97, DESCRIPTION OF CHAIRMAN’S MARK OF THE “TAX TECHNICAL
CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1997” 17–18 (1997).
51 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, § 6005(e)(2), 114
Stat. 685, 805–06 (1998).
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announce its insistence on the letter of the current law when it was
overwhelmingly likely that Congress would sooner or later make that aspect of
current law a nullity. What was a tax administrator to do?
Because the 1997 tax return season fell within the limbo period, the IRS had
to address—one way or another—the less-than-two-year exclusion formula in
its Publication 523, “Selling Your Home,” for use in preparing 1997 returns. 52
Without alerting taxpayers to the vagaries of the tax legislative process, the 1997
version of Publication 523 simply described the formula in the technical
corrections bill without mentioning that it had not yet been enacted. 53 This was
a brilliant solution; it enabled the IRS to describe to taxpayers what it knew
would ultimately be the governing rule, without having to state in a document
with status as legal precedent (such as a revenue ruling) that it was administering
the law based on its legislative predictions. Although this was unquestionably a
peculiar IRS use of a publication, it seems to me to have been the least bad of
the available options.
CONCLUSION
To end where I began, Blank and Osofsky have made a major contribution
in their article, both in their analysis of the etiology and treatment (not cure) of
simplexity in IRS publications, and in their insistence that IRS publications are
worthy of scholarly attention. If there is a thread running through many of the
points I have raised in this response, it is that a fuller understanding of the uses
and abuses of IRS publications might be achieved by supplementing the
approach of Blank and Osofsky—which is, for the most part, based on a
snapshot view of publications in their current versions—with an examination of
how the various publications have evolved, or have failed to evolve, over recent
decades.

52 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 523, SELLING YOUR HOME 30 (1998)
(for use in preparing 1997 returns).
53 Id.

